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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Brandon Wayne Estes appeals from the revocation of his probation.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Estes battered Kimberly Polley by biting her face in the course of a fight.
(R., pp. 18-19.) The state charged Estes with felony domestic violence, with a
persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp. 55-56, 60-62.) Estes pled guilty to the
domestic violence charge and the state dismissed the enhancement, and the
parties agreed to sentencing recommendations which included probation and
mental health court.

(R., pp. 172-73.) The district court accepted the plea,

imposed a sentence of six years with two and one-half years determinate,
suspended execution of the sentence, and ordered probation. (R., pp. 193, 198210.) One term of probation was that Estes “enroll in, comply with, and complete
all Mental Health Court programming requirements.” (R., p. 208.)
Estes quickly violated the terms of mental health court by missing
appointments, making threats, not taking urinalysis tests, violating curfew, and
having unapproved associations. (R., pp. 218-20.) The state moved to revoke
his probation for being terminated from mental health court and also violating
additional conditions of probation. (R., pp. 222-32.)
The district court arraigned Estes on the probation violation allegations,
and notified him of his rights. (R., pp. 237-38.) The district court appointed the
public defender, Estes denied the allegations, and the court scheduled an
evidentiary hearing. (R., p. 240.) The evidentiary hearing was held on two days,
1

in which the court took evidence from both parties. (R., pp. 256-58, 266, 271-74,
280.) The court thereafter entered a written memorandum opinion and order
finding Estes violated the terms of probation. (R., pp. 288-93.) The district court
rejected Estes’ claim that his termination from mental health court violated due
process, concluding that the proceedings on the probation violation in the
criminal case complied with due process requirements, and therefore Estes was
not entitled to additional process before the mental health court. (Id.)
After a hearing on disposition (R., p. 312), the district court revoked
probation and ordered the sentence executed (R., pp. 313-16). Estes filed a
motion for reconsideration under Rule 35, which the district court denied. (R.,
pp. 318-24.) Estes filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 326-29.)
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ISSUES
Estes states the issues on appeal as:
Issue 1:

The Mental Health Court did not provide adequate
due process when terminating defendant from
diversionary program.

Issue 2:

District Court improperly decided disputed facts when
revoking probation and imposing sentence.

Issue 3:

There was not substantial and competent evidence to
support the mental health court’s decision to
terminate defendant from diversionary program.

(Appellant’s brief, p. 4 (verbatim).)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Estes failed to show that the district court erred when it concluded
that Estes had been provided with due process?
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ARGUMENT
Estes Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Concluded That
Estes Had Been Provided With Due Process
A.

Introduction
The district court concluded that the process afforded in the probation

violation proceedings fully complied with due process requirements.

(R.,

pp. 288-93.) The district court first found by a preponderance of the evidence
that Estes had violated the terms of his probation by being terminated from
mental health court for “threatening behavior, missed curfew, missed
appointments, and … unapproved associations” and by being evicted from “My
House” for “aggressive behavior towards other residents.” (R., p. 289.) The
district court specifically rejected the argument that the due process requirements
for revoking probation had to be complied with prior to, as opposed to after,
termination from mental health court. (R., pp. 290-93.)
On appeal Estes claims the district court erred, arguing that he had a
separate right to be in mental health court and therefore a separate due process
right to notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to termination from that
program. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-11.) Review of applicable law shows that
Estes was provided due process prior to deprivation of his probation liberty
interest.
B.

Standard Of Review
“Due process issues are generally questions of law.”

Idaho Historic

Preservation Council, Inc. v. City Council of the City of Boise, 134 Idaho 651,
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654, 8 P.3d 646, 649 (2000). The standard of appellate review applicable to
constitutional issues is one of deference to factual findings, unless they are
clearly erroneous, but free review of whether constitutional requirements have
been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380,
79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d
786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001).
C.

Estes Was Provided Due Process
“The right to procedural due process guaranteed under both the Idaho and

United States Constitutions requires that a person involved in the judicial process
be given meaningful notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” State v.
Blair, 149 Idaho 720, 722, 239 P.3d 825, 827 (Ct. App. 2010). A probationer
“has a protected liberty interest in continuing probation, and is therefore entitled
to due process before probation may be revoked.” State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762,
766, 171 P.3d 253, 257 (2007). This “process is to be flexible, does not need to
be equated to a separate criminal prosecution and may be informal,” but
generally requires written notice, disclosure of evidence, an opportunity to be
heard and present evidence, the right to confront opposing evidence, a neutral
and detached decision-maker, and written statements as to the basis for revoking
probation. State v. Rogers, 144 Idaho 738, 743, 170 P.3d 881, 886 (2007).
The record establishes that this basic process was provided in the
probation proceedings before the district court. (R., pp. 222-32 (written notice of
the probation violation allegations), 237-38 (arraignment and appointment of
counsel), 256-58, 266 (day one of the evidentiary hearing), 271-74, 280 (day two
5

of the evidentiary hearing), 288-93 (district court written findings of fact).) The
district court rejected Estes’ argument that due process demanded this process
be provided in the mental health court instead of (or in addition to) the criminal
court. (R., pp. 289-90.) Application of the relevant law shows the district court’s
decision was correct.
In State v. Rogers, 144 Idaho 738, 739, 170 P.3d 881, 882 (2007), Rogers
was placed in drug court as a diversionary program after pleading guilty,
meaning that the state would dismiss the case if Rogers successfully completed
drug court.

Rogers violated several program rules, so the drug court judge

terminated Rogers from the program without a formal hearing and then
proceeded to sentencing. Id. at 740, 170 P.3d at 883. The Court articulated the
due process issue relative to diversionary programs as follows:
[w]here a defendant enters a diversionary program prior to entering
a plea he maintains his right to assert his innocence and has no
liberty interest at stake as expulsion from the program will leave
him in the exact same position as he was before entering it.
However, when a defendant pleads guilty in order to enter a
diversionary program he has a liberty interest at stake as he will no
longer be able to assert his innocence if expelled from the program.
Id. at 741, 170 P.3d at 884. Concluding that Rogers’ expulsion from the drug
court diversionary program would result in a loss of his liberty, the Court then
determined that “the liberty interest involved is akin to that in probation and
parole revocation hearings” and therefore the same process as in those
proceedings was due. Id. at 742, 170 P.3d at 885.
The district court distinguished Rogers on the basis that mental health
court in this case was not a diversionary program, as drug court was in Rogers,
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but was instead a condition of probation. (R., p. 290.) The Court found “no
cognizable reason” why due process requirements could not be afforded in the
criminal case, as opposed to in the mental health court. (R., pp. 290-91.)
The district court’s analysis is correct. In Rogers the drug court was a
diversionary program, meaning that upon his discharge Rogers went immediately
to sentencing without any additional process.

In this case, because mental

health court was a condition of probation, discharge put Estes back before the
criminal court where he was afforded due process before any liberty interest was
rescinded. Because the record shows Estes was afforded the full due process
rights to which he was entitled before he lost his liberty, there was no violation of
due process.
Estes argues that his case is identical to Rogers because he too was
“placed in a diversionary program” and his termination from mental health court
“resulted in his being criminally sentenced and having a felony conviction appear
on his record.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-9.) This argument is based on a false
representation of the procedural history of this case. As noted above, Estes was
not put in mental health court as a diversionary program with the promise that the
case would be dismissed. Rather, he pled guilty and was placed in mental health
court as a condition of probation. (R., pp. 172-73, 193, 198-210.) Because this
case was a straight-up probation violation case, and the process due a probation
violation was provided, Estes has failed to show error.
Estes next argues that because the district court lacked the authority to
order him reinstated in mental health court that the proceedings in the criminal
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court could not provide him due process. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-10.) This
argument confuses what liberty interest Estes had.

As noted above, a

probationer “has a protected liberty interest in continuing probation, and is
therefore entitled to due process before probation may be revoked.”

Rose,

144 Idaho at 766, 171 P.3d at 257 (emphasis added). Because the criminal
court had authority to continue Estes on probation or to revoke that probation,
Estes was afforded due process prior to losing his liberty interest.
Estes finally argues the district court lacked “substantial and competent
evidence to substantiate the mental health court judges [sic] decision to
terminate him from the program” because one of his several mental health court
violations was missing an appointment scheduled prior to sentencing (compare
R., p. 218 (Estes missed appointment on “the week of September 24, 2015”) with
R., p. 198 (sentenced on September 28, 2015)). (Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-11.)
Estes has failed to show error. First, Estes has failed to establish the relevance
of this argument. The relevant condition of probation was that Estes “enroll in,
comply with, and complete all Mental Health Court programming requirements.”
(R., p. 208.) Evidence that he missed an appointment just prior to sentencing
was relevant to whether he had complied with this term of probation. Second,
Estes was not found in violation of his probation for a single missed appointment.
The district court found Estes’ various failures regarding mental health court
proved by a preponderance of the evidence. (R., p. 289.) Even excluding the
single missed appointment, there was a plethora of evidence showing that Estes’
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expulsion from mental health court was justified for failure to obey the applicable
rules. (R., pp. 218-20.)
The district court concluded that Estes’ was provided due process.
Because Estes was provided all the process due prior to terminating his
probationary liberty interest, Estes has failed to show error by the district court.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order
revoking probation.
DATED this 20th day of July, 2017.

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen__________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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